Why the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center stubbornly resists the development of the Angara district?
Immediately I will say that I do not speak against Angara, primarily against Angara 1.? I oppose the exploitation of Angara-A5 because in the version in which it is designed it is not cost-effective.
In the article, I will not even raise such questions as, for example, why the Khrunichev State Scientific and Cultural Center:
1. Has played back the already decided contest.
2. I lied about the fact that RD-0120 can not be recreated, it was necessary to close the zinnit-like first variant of the Angara.
3. I chose such a strange East /Soyuz-like layout, and even with URMs which is not only outdated, but also creates difficulties (URMs reduce MN).
4. Mistaken with the output from Plesetsk PN on 4 tons (22 against the declared 26), to compensate for this error, it took two more forcing the engine from 175 to 217 tons.
5. Despite the fat years, the creation of the rocket was carried out for more than 10 years and this despite the fact that the creation of a heavy rocket in complexity is really close to creating an easy (dignified package layout), i.e. the simplest Angara 1.2 rocket did more than 10 years.
Briefly and capaciously the meaning of the question can be explained by the following quotation:
"When Glushko assembled a second, enlarged meeting, on which he once again dwelt on his idea of developing a unified family of carriers, created from a different number of standard rocket units. Telling about this, Valentin Petrovich as an illustration took in hand a pack of identical pencils and began to show different versions of future LV, clamping in his hand a different number of pencils. The present audience reacted negatively to this - the first speaker said: "We did this with MK Tikhonravov in 1953 when carrying out work on the topic" Package "at NII-4. You can not do anything - you can not create a family of carriers of different classes from the same blocks so that each of the carriers is efficient enough in its class. "
Since the Angara district has already been created and created with great difficulty, and most importantly, it already has a launch pad, then closing it means writing off all the money spent on it. The military remain without independent access to outer space, let even at a high price.
Doing the same start on the East - means making Angara the main missile, that given the track record of the Khrunichev Space Center is expensive and dangerous, expensive because of the high cost of the missile itself and is dangerous because the Khrunichev Space Center can still something to throw out or again to delay development.
The hopes for the seriality of the rocket are rather illusory because seriality can only be achieved with commercial launches, since Angara-1.? which replaces Rokoty and Cyclones, is unlikely to be launched more than 3-4 times a year, the same need for state starts is not more 3-4 per year. Total total equivalent Angara-A5 can run no more than 4-5 times a year, i.e. seriality will build up long and painfully, just as long and painfully will reduce the cost of the launch.
The proposed plans to transfer production to Omsk, accelerate engines, reduce the mass of the Angara, start in the East, the hydrogen second stage - will reduce the severity of the problem, but can not solve it, because its solution is possible only by eliminating the shortcomings of the missile, which, despite the use of modern materials , in terms of design is very conservative, I would say yes archaic.
I am pleased to resolve the problem of the Khrunichev Space Center, which the SCNPC can not resolve for many years:
1. Shutdown throttling during operation of the first stage in the four accelerators should not only increase the MI, but also save fuel for the operation of the first stage at altitude, separately from the accelerators.
2. Installation of retractable nozzle nozzles and shortening of the nozzle to a coefficient of ? not only relieve the losses from overexpansion at the start and increase the thrust and UI, but also increase the thrust and UI with the help of retractable nozzle nozzles, this is equivalent to forcing the RD-191 by 10-15 % for the minimum money.
3. The washing of the first stage from the lateral accelerators will allow to save fuel in the first stage, which will lead to a sharp increase in PN, by 20-30%, which naturally leads to an equally sharp decrease in the price per kg.
All this will allow the military, the main customers of the missile, to take satellites from Plesetsk to GSO that can take Proton from Baikonur, and even though Plesetsk is extremely unprofitable.
No matter what I feel hurt, I can say that the package versions of the methane Phoenix, Rusi-M and Energy-K look about the same. Ie SCNPT is not the only one - this is a general setup and, accordingly, the problem of our rocket engineering. Who gave a go-ahead for the creation of exclusively packet-packed missiles is a separate topic that goes beyond the scope of this article.
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